In this paper we investigate the k-set consensus problem in asynchronous, message-passing distributed systems. In this problem, each participating process begins the protocol with an input value and by the end of the protocol must decide on one value so that at most k different values are decided by all correct processes. We extend previous work by exploring several variations of the problem definition and model, including for the first time investigation of Byzantine failures. We show that the precise definition of the validity requirement, which characterizes what decision values are allowed as a function of the input values and whether failures occur, is crucial to the solvability of the problem. For example, we show that allowing default decisions in case of failures makes the problem solvable for most values of k despite a minority of failures, even for the most severe type of failures (Byiantine). We introduce six validity conditions for this problem (all considered in various contexts in the literature), and demarcate the line between possible and impossible for each case. In many cases this line is different from the one of the originally studied k-set consensus problem.
Introduction
The k-set consensus problem is an abstraction of many coordination problems in a distributed system that can suffer process failures. Each process begins with an input value and must irrevocably decide on one output value, so that a total of at most k values are decided by correct processes. The set of allowed decision values are specified by a validity condition that constrains the decisions of correct processes as a function of the input values and whether failures occur during the run of the protocol.
In this paper we explore the solvability of the k-set consensus problem in asynchronous message passing systems, in models in which processes fail by crashing or fail arbitrarily (Byzantine failures). The main theme in this paper is that the validity condition has a profound impact on when the problem is solvable. We consider six diierent validity conditions and use these conditions to demarcate when k-set consensus is solvable for each system model. In several cases we completely characterize solvability. In some we charac- ' con.
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The k-set consensus problem was introduced by Chaudhuri [5] , who studied the problem in asynchronous message passing systems in which processes fail by crashing. The validity condition adopted in [5] requires that each correct process decide on a value that is equal to some input value. In this context, Chaudhuri provided a protocol to solve the k-set consensus problem that tolerates up to t < k process failures. The condition t < k was later proved to be necessary in thii context [3, 7, 131 (see also [l) ). The six validity conditions we study include the one originally used in [5] and others studied for k = 1 (consensus) with crash and Byzantine failures (e.g., see [ll] ). For k = 1, the condition = 0 is known to be necessary for any nontrivial validity tondition (61.
The rest of this abstract is structured as follows. In Section 2 we define the problem. We study the k-set consensus problem for message passing systems with crash-failures in Section 3, and for message passing systems with Byzantine failures in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and outlines directions for future work.
The problem
We consider a distributed system consisting of n processes denoted by pl ,p2, . . . . pn. A process that follows its protocol specification throughout an execution is said to be correct, and a process that departs from its specification is said to be faulty. In the cmah model, faulty processes are allowed to prematurely halt execution only. In the Byzantine model, a faulty process can deviate from its specification arbitrarily.
We sssume that at most t processes fail, where t 2 1 is a known, positive integer.
Processes communicate by sending messages. We assume that the underlying communication network is complete, that is, there is a communication channel for each pair of processes. Communication is reliable and authenticated, in the sense that a correct process pi receives a message m from a correct process pj if and only if pj sent m to pi. Processes may take an arbitrary (but finite) time to execute a step and messages may incur an arbitrary (but finite) delay on the communication network. That is, the system is asynchronous.
We denote a k-set consensus problem by SC(k) or simply SC when k is not relevant. For any k, 1 5 k 5 n, the SC(k) problem is defined as follows. Each process pi starts the computation with an input value vi. Each correct process has to irreversibly "decide" on a value in such a way that three conditions, called termination, agreement and validity, hold. These conditions are:
Every correct process eventually decides.
Agreement:
The set of values decided by correct process-has size at most k.
Validity:
One of the following conditions. Given a validity condition C, we denote by SC(k,C) the SC(k) problem defined with validity C. We also use the notation SC(C) if k is not relevant. We use the notation SC(k,t) to denote a SC(k) consensus problem with at most t failures allowed. The notation SC(k,t,C) denotes SC(k,t) with validity C.
We define a partial order on the SC problems based on the strength of the validity conditions. We say that SC(C) SC(k,Rvl) is the consensus problem as considered by Chaudhuri [5] . SC (l,~vl) and SC(l,~v2) are classical consensus problems (see, e.g., [lo, Ch. 61) . SC(l,sv2) has been considered in the Byzantine setting [9, 121 . SC (l,wvZ) is weak Byzantine agreement [8] .
It is well known that SC(l) cannot be solved for any nontrivial validity condition [6] and, in particular, for any of the validity conditions that we consider here. On the other hand, SC(n) is trivially solvable (each process decides its own value), even in the Byzantine setting, for any t and with the strongest validity condition we are considering, that is, validity SvI. Thus, we will henceforth be concerned only for the cases 2 5 k 5 n -1. Since the problem is easily solvable for t = 0 we also assume that t 2 1.
Crash failures
In this section we consider the crash model. As noted in Settion 1, for these systems we already know the line between computable and impossible for SC(k, t,wl): Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the results provided in this section.
Impossibilities
In this section we provide impossibility results for the crash model. An ingredient in most of our impossibility results is the fact that in any protocol tolerating t failures, a process must be able to decide after communicating with at most n -t processes (including itself). Indeed, if a process waited to communicate with more than n-t processes, termination could not be achieved: the runs in which there were exactly t faulty processes that do not send any messages, would not terminate.
Lemma 3.3 Zn the crash model, there is no protocol for SC(k,t,Wvl), fort > v.
Proof: For a contradiction, assume that such a protocol A exists. In the rest of the proof we use the notation SCp(k, t, C) to explicitly state the set P of processes among which k-set consensus is to be solved. Denoting by P the set of all processes, we have that A solves SCp(k, t, WV~). Since t 2 ((k -1)n + 1)/k implies n 2 k(n -t) + 1, we can partition the n processes into k groups gi , gz, . . . , gk of disjoint processes with gi,, . . ..gk-1 containing exactly n-t processes and gk containing at least ?a -t + 1 processes. If t = 12 we let Ql,Q2,...,Qk-1 be singleton sets of processes and we let gk contain at least two processes (this iS possible because we only consider k < n).
First we claim that there is a run of A where only processes in gk take steps and such that two values are decided. To see why, assume that all the runs involving only processes of gk are such that only one value is decided. Then we could use A tosolveSC,,(l,l,Wv2):
gk contains at least n-t+1 processes, so that even if one of them is faulty we still have at least ra -t correct processes in gk and hence the protocol has to terminate. However, this contradicts [6] , since no such protocol exists. Hence there is a run ok in which only processes in gk take steps and they decide on at least two different values, say Vk, Vk+I. Let VI, . . ..vk-1 be k-1 values different from Vk, Vk+l. Fix i, i E {1,2, . . . . k -1) and consider the following run oi: all processes are correct, all start with ui and all messages sent to processes in gj, j = 1,2, . . . . . k by processes not in gj are delayed until all processes in gj make a decision. We can use A to solve SCp(k, t, wv2) and by validity wv2 we have that all processes, in particular those in group gi, decide vi. Now consider the following run a. All processes are correct, for each i, i = 1,2, . . . . k -1, each process in gi starts with vi and processes in gk start with the same values they start in ok. Moreover for each i, i = 1,2, . . . . k, all messages sent to processes in group gi by processes not in gi are delayed until all processes in gi have decided. We can use A to solve SCp(k, t, WV~) in a. However, for each i, i = 1,2, . . . . k, processes in gi cannot distinguish between run Qi and run (2. Indeed in both runs they only communicate with processes in gi before making a decision and in both runs processes in gi start with the same value. Since, for i = 1,2, . . . . k -1, in run oi processes in gi decide vi, they must decide vi also in cr. Since in run ok PrOCesSeS in gk decide on Vk and ?&+I, they must decide Vk and Vk+l also in a. Hence we have that k + 1 values are decided in a. Thus the agreement condition is violated and this contradicts the hypothesis that A solves SCP(k, t, wv2). 0
Lemma 3.4 In the crash model, there is no protocol for SC(k,t,wvl), fort 1 k.
Proof: For a contradiction sssume that there exists such a protocol A. We claim that A can be used to solve SC(k,t,nvl) for t 2 k. To see why, consider any run a in which f 5 t pro ceases are faulty and let g be the set of correct processes and g' be the set of faulty processes. Now consider a run cu' that is identical to a except that all processes are correct and any message sent by any p E g' in a' after the time that p failed in Q is delayed until after all processes in g decide. That is, for each pi E g and each pj E g', pi receives a message from pj at time T in o' iff pi receives the same message at time T from pj in a. By the validity condition WV~, each process decides on some process' input in Q'. Clearly, processes in g cannot distinguish between o and Q'. Hence, processes in g decide the same value in Q as they decide in a', and so validity ~1 is satisfied in a. In other words, protocol A solves SC(k,t,RVl) for t >_ k, contradicting Lemma 3.2. 0 Lemma 3.5 In the crash model, there is no protocol for SC(k,t,svl).
Proof: For a contradiction sssume that there exists such a protocol A. Let Q be an execution of A in which all processes are correct and they all start with different values. Let v a decision made by at Iesst two processes (there is always such a decision since k < n). Because of validity svl, v is the input of some process pi and since all inputs are different only pi has v as input. Now consider the run a' that is the same as Q except that process pi fails right after sending its last message. Clearly a and a' are indistinguishable and thus each process (maybe with the exception of pi) makes the same decision in both runs. Hence in o' value v is decided by at least one process pj, j # i. But only pi has v as input and p; is not correct in cr', and so validity ~1 is violated. II Lemma 3.6 In the crash model, there is no protocol for SC(k,t,sV2), fort 2 7&n.
Proof: For a contradiction sssume that there exists such a protocol A. Consider first the case t 1 %. Partition the system into two non-intersecting sets of processes, g, g', each
containing at least n -t processes (e.g., 191 = /g'/ = n/2). This is always possible because t 2 n/2. Let a be a run of A in which all processes are correct, all start with different initial values denoted vi, 7~2, . . . . vn, and all communication between g and g' is delayed until after the decisions are made. We claim that n values are decided in o. To see this, fix any process pi E g, and consider the following run oi. The processes in g start with the same values as in Q, and all except pi crash after pi reaches a decision. All the processes in g' start with vi but communication between g and g' is delayed until after pi makes a decision. By ~2, pi must decide vi in oi, and by indistinguishability of a from oi , pi must decide vi in cr. Similarly, runs ai can be constructed for every process pi E g', and hence all processes must decide their own values in o. This contradicts the hypothesis that A solves the problem (for k < n). Now consider the case t < t. In this case, n -2t x r! and the condition t 2 n& is equivalent to k 5 2 -1.
Let g be a subset of the system containing n -t processes, and let gi , . . . . gl%, be a partition of g into disjoint sets of size at least n -"St each. Let (I be a run of A in which all the processes are correct, communication between g and the rest of the system is delayed until after all processes have decided and, for each i, processes in gi start with a distinct value vi. Fix i, and let pi E gi be some process. Consider a run oi of A as follows: Processes in gi are correct, all processes in g \ gi are faulty, and crash after pi decides. All communication between g and the rest of the system is delayed until after pi decides. By SV~, pi must decide vi, but since a is indistinguishable to pi from oi, pi must decide vi in a. Therefore, in a, at least 1s
J different values are decided on. This contradicts the hypothesis that A solves the problem since k 5 5 -1 < 151. Cl
Protocols
In this section we provide two protocols for the crash model.
PROTOCOL A: Each process broadcasts its input and waits for n -t messages. If all n -t messages contain the same value v, then the process decides v, else it decides a default value vc.
Lemma 3.7 PROTOCOL A solves SC(k,t,RV2) in the crash model fort < yn.
Proof: We start by proving termination.
The number of actual failures is less or equal to t. Hence there are at least n-t correct processes. Thus each correct process eventually receives at least n-t messages and is able to make a decision.
Now we prove agreement. By the sake of contradiction assume that k + 1 values are decided. One of them could be the default value, but at least k values, diierent from the default value, are decided. By the protocol it is necessary that there be k disjoint sets gi, gs, . . . . gk, each consisting of at least n -t processes such that each process in gi sends a value vi (with vi # uj for i # j). Hence there must be at least k(n -t) processes. However since t < k$n we have that n -t > n/k and that k(n -t) > n, which implies that there must be more than n processes. This is impossible since we have n processes.
Finally we prove validity. Assume that all processes start with value u. Clearly a process cannot receive two different values since v is the only value being sent. Hence by the protocol each process that makes a decision, decides v. 0 PROTOCOL B: Each process broadcasts its input and waits for n -t messages. One of these n -t messages is the process' own message. If n -2t messages contain the same value as its own, say v, the process decides v, else it decides a default value VO.
Lemma 3.8 PROTOCOL B solves SC(k,t,sv2) in the cmsh model fort < +a.
Proof: We start by proving termination. The number of actual failures is less or equal to t. Hence there are at least n-t correct processes. Thus each correct process eventually receives at least n-t messages and is able to make a decision. Now we prove agreement. By the sake of contradiction assume that k + 1 values are decided. One of them could be the default value, but at least k values, different from the default value, are decided. By the protocol it is necessary that there be k disjoint sets gi, gs, . . . . gk, each consisting of at least n -2t processes such that each process in gi sends a value vi (with v; # uj for i # j). Hence there must be at least k(n -2t) processes. However since t < %n we have that k(n -2t) > n, which implies that there must be more than n processes. This is impossible since we have n processes.
Finally we prove validity. Assume that all correct processes start with value v. We have to prove that a correct process decides v. Let p be a correct process. First we observe that since p starts with v it decides v or ve. Hence it suffices to prove that p receives at least n -2t messages with v. Among the n -t messages p receives at least n -2t are from correct processes. Hence process p receives at least n -2t messages with v. II
Remarks
For SC(FLVS) and SC(WVS), there is a very tiny gap between our possibility and impossibility results (Lemmas 3.3 and 3.7), formed by the cases where n is a multiple of k. These are isolated points on the line that separates possible from impossible. Since for all other points on this line the problem is not solvable it would be very surprising if for those isolated points the problem is solvable. For SC(sv2) there is also small gap between our possibility and impossibility results (Lemmas 3.6 and 3.8).
Byzantine failures
In thii section we consider the Byzantine model. In Section 4.1 we are concerned with impossibilities and in Section 4.2 we provide protocols. Figure 3 shows a graphical representation of the results.
Impossibilities
In this section we provide impossibility results for the Byzantine model. Clearly the impossibilities proved for the crash model still hold. In particular the impossibilities for SC(svl) and SC(wv1) are directly derived from the corresponding ones for the crash model. Next we provide additional impossibilities.
Lemma 4.1 Zn the Byzantine model, there is no protocol that solves SC(k,t,w2), fort 3 &n and t >_ k.
Proof: For a contradiction assume that such a protocol A exists. We distinguish two cases: (i) t >_ n/2 and (ii) t < n/2. Consider case (i). Let vi, us, . . . . vt+i be t + 1 different values. Let (L be the following run of A. The number of actual failures in (Y is f = n-t -1. Let F be the set of faulty processes and let p1 , . ..pt+l be the correct processes. Pro-CESS pi has input vi, for i = 1,2, . . . . t + 1. Messages between any two correct processes are delayed until all correct processes decide, that is, correct processes communicate only with processes in F.
We now show that at least k + 1 values are decided in CY, which contradicts the hypothesis that A solves the problem. For each i = 1,2, . . . . t + 1 consider the following run Qi. All processes are correct, all have input vi, messages between processes not beIonging to F are delayed until all processes not in F decide. By validity WV~, we have that in oi all processes must decide vi. Process pi, for i = 1,2, . . . . t + 1, cannot distinguish between cr and ~i, if in Q, the members of F behave as if they were correct and had vi initially. Hence pi has to decide the same value in both runs. We have that process Pi decides vi also in cr. Since vr, us, . . . . vt+i are different, we have that t + 1 values are decided in Q. But t 1 k, hence at least k + 1 values are decided in o.
Consider case (ii). Since t < n/2 we have that n-2t > 0 and thus the condition t > _ &n is equivalent to s > k+l. Then, we can partition the processes into k+2 groups, the 6rst k+l of which, denoted gi,gs, . . ..gk+i. each consists of at least n -2t processes, and the last of which, denoted F, consists oft processes. Let Q be the following run of A. Let v1,v2,..., vk+l be k + 1 d&rent values. Processes in gi start with vi, for i = 1,2,..., k + 1, and processes in F are faulty. Processes in group gi communicate only within g; and with processes in F. For each group gi processes in F behave as correct processes with input vi.
We now show that at least k + 1 values are decided in o, which contradicts the hypothesis that A solves the problem. For each i = 1,2, . . . . k + 1 consider the following run oi. All processes are correct, all have input vi, processes in group gi communicate only within gi and with processes in F. By validity WV~, we have that in oi all processes must decide vi. Processes in gi, for i = 1,2, . . . . k + 1, cannot distinguish between Q and ai. Hence they have to decide the same value in both runs, and so processes in gi decide vi also in a. ProoE For a contradiction assume that such a protocol A exists. Let ~1 be a run of A in which all processes are correct and each start with a different input value. Let vi, . . . . vZ be the set of values decided by correct processes. Because A satisfies validity ~vl, each of the vi is the input of some process. Since z < k < n, we have that there exists a value vi, 1 < i < z, decTded by at least two processes, say pl and P2.
Let process q be the process whose input in (~1 is vi for some i E (1, . . . . z}. Use A in the run a2 in which q is faulty but behaves as in al, claiming that vi is its input, but it has vi as its input, with vi different from vi and also from any other input. Since correct processes cannot distinguish between (~1 and (~2 they have to decide on the same value. We now distinguish three possible cases: (1) q is different frombothplandpz, (2) Proof: The proof is similar to that for Lemma 3.6. For a contradiction assume that such a protocol A exists. We distinguish two cases: (i) t < n/2 and (ii) t 2 n/2. Consider case (i). Since t < n/2 we have that n -2t > 0 and thus the condition t > _ &n is equivalent to A 2 k + 1. Then, we can partition the processes in k + 1 groups each consisting of at least n -2t processes. Consider case (ii). In this case we partition the processes in k + 1 groups each consisting of at least one process.
In both cases, let 91, g2 , -, gk:r Qk+l be the k + 1 groups of processes. Let VI , . ..vk+l be k + 1 different values and consider the following run a. All processes are correct, pro-CXSS~S in group gi start with Vi. For each group g+, there is a set of t processes not belonging to gi, call it Fi, such that, for each i, communication is allowed only among processes in gi and Fi until all processes have decided. Notice that the cardinality of gi U Fi is at least n -t in both cases.
We now show that k + 1 values are decided in CY, which contradicts the hypothesis that A solves the problem. Fix i, 1 5 i 5 k + 1, and consider run Oi. There are exactly t faulty processes and these processes are those in Fi. Processes in gi are correct. All processes start with vi. Faulty processes behave exactly as they do in run CY. Processes in gi communicate only with other processes in gi and Fi. We can use A to solve SC(k,t,Rv2), and by the validity RV2 we have that all correct processes, and in particular those in gi decide vi. Processes in gi cannot distinguish run Q and run ai. Hence, since they decide tli in ai they have to decide vi also in a. It follows that k + 1 values are decided in cr. 0
Protocols
In this section we provide protocols for the Byzantine model. We start by observing that PROTOCOL A, used for the crash model, solves SC(WV~) also in the Byzantine model, though only for a restricted range of values of k and t.
Lemma 4.4 PROTOCOL A solves SC(k,t,WP)
in the Byzantine model for t < n/2 and k 2 2 + 1.
Proof: We start by proving termination. Since there are at most t failures, correct processes are guaranteed to receive at least n -t messages and thus they decide.
Next we prove agreement. To have a bound on the number of possible decisions we look at how many values different from the default value can be decided. Let f be the number of actual failures. We have that any group of n -t -f correct processes that start with the same value can be forced by the f faulty processes to decide that value.
Notice that since f 5 t < n/2 we have that n -t -f 2 1.
Hence the number of decisions can be as big as the number of possible disjoint groups of n -t -f correct processes, plus one to take into account the default value. There can be at most (n -f)/(n -t -f) such groups. This function is an increasing function of f and thus it achieves its maximum value for f = t. Hence the number of different fec$;t r,(can have is at most (n -t)/(n -2t) + 1. Since n -2t) + 1 agreement is satisfied. -Finally we prove validity. Assume that all processes are correct and start with v. Then clearly v is the only decision. Cl Lemma 4.5 PROTOCOL A solves SC(k,t,wv2) in the Byzantine model for t > n/2 and k 1 t + 1.
Proof: Termination and validity are as in the previous lemma. Next we prove agreement. Let f be the number of actual failures. We distinguish two cases: (i) f 2 n -t -2 and (ii) f > n -t -2. In case (i) we have that for any n -t messages received by a process, at least two of them are sent by correct processes. Hence for each different value v # vo decided by some process at least two correct processes have sent that value. Hence no more than n/2 values different from the default value vo can be decided. Hence at most n/2 + 1 difkrent values can be decided in case (i). In case (ii) the number of correct processes is strictly less than t +2. Hence we cannot have more than t + 1 different decisions. Putting together the two cases, we have that the number of different decisions is at most max{n/2+ 1, t + 1) = t + 1 5 k.
Cl
Next we provide a generalized version of the "echo" protocol of Bra&a and Toueg 141, which we call &echo, where e 2 2.
(The l-echo protocol is Bra&a and Toueg's echo protocol.)
The &echo protocols will be used to provide a family of protocols for SC(SV2).
e-echo protocol:
To .&echo broadcast a message m, the sender s sends the message (init,s,m) to all other processes. When a process p receives the first (init,s,m) from s, it sends the message (echo,s,m) to all other processes. Subsequent init messages from 9 are ignored. If process p receives message (echo,s,m) from more than (n -t .tt)/(t + 1) processes, then process p accepts message m as sent by the sender process s. Lemma 4.6 In a system with t < ln/(2.! + l), if a sender s uses the .&echo protocol to send a message m then:
(i) Correct processes accept at most e different messages.
(ii) If 8 is correct, every correct process accepts m.
Proof: Fit we prove (i). By sake of contradiction assume that correct processes accept e + 1 different messages ml, ma, . . . . rnt+l. Then there must be L+l correct processes, say pl,p2, . . ..pt+l. such that process pi receives more than (n+et)/(e+l) ethos with mi, for each i = 1,2, . . . . .!+l. Thus there must be a total of more than n + et ethos sent for the messages ml, m2, . . . . rnl+l. Let f be the actual number of faulty processes. Since a faulty process can send e+ 1 different ethos (it can echo ml to pl, m2 to p2 and SO on) we have that strictly more than n+&-(e+l)f 1 n+ef -(e+l)f = n -f ethos are sent, by correct processes. This implies that at least one correct process sent two different ethos, which is not possible. Now we prove (ii). If the sender is correct. then it sends an init message for. m to all other processes. Any correct process will receive this and broadcast an echo message for m. Because there are at most t < (n + &)/(e + 1) faldty processes, no correct process accepts any message other than m. Since there are at least n -t correct processes, it is sufficient that n-t be strictly greater than (n+Lt)/(e+l) in order to guarantee that any correct process receives enough echo messages to be able to accept m. Since t < &/(2[ + 1) we have that n -t > (n + et)/(e + 1).
Cl The t&ho protocol is used to define a family of protocols for SC(k, t,sv2) as follows.
PROTOCOL c(e): Each process broadcasts its input using the f-echo protocol and waits for n -t messages to be accepted, where one of these n-t messages is the process' own message. If n -2t messages contain the same value u, then the process decides v, else it decides a default value we.
Lemma 4.7 PROTOCOL c(e) solves SC(k,t,sv2) in the Byzantine model for t < an and t < &pa.
Since there are at least n -t correct processes, each correct process eventually accepts at least n -t messages broadcast by e-echo and is able to make a decision. Now we prove agreement. For a contradiction assume that k + 1 values are decided. One of them could be the default value, but at least k values, different from the default value, are decided. By the protocol it is necessary that there be k sets gi, gz, . . . . gk, each consisting of at least n -2t processes, such that some correct process accepts a value vi from each process in gi (with vi # vj for i # j). Hence correct processes accept at least k(n -2t) values broadcast by e-echo. Each faulty process can contribute L different values, and so the number of different senders is at least k(n -2t) -(L -1)t. However since t < &&n, we have that k > w and thus k(n -2t) -(e -1)t > n, which implies that there must be more than n processes, a contradiction.
Finally we prove validity. Assume that all correct processes start with value v. We have to prove that a correct process decides v. Let p be a correct process. First we observe that since p starts with v it either decides v or vo. Hence it suffices to prove that p receives at least n -2t messages with v. Among the n -t messages p receives at least n -2t are from correct processes. Hence process p receives at least n -2t messages with v. Ll Finally we provide a protocol for SC(wv1).
PROTOCOL D: Processespl,p2, . . ..pt+l each broadcasts its input value. A process that receives a value vi from pi, i E { 1,2, . . . . t + l}, broadcasts an (echo,vi,pi) message and never ~&OS a value for pi again. Processes pl,pg, . . . . pk each decides on its own value. Every other process decides the first value vi, i E (1,. . . , t + l}, for which it receives identical ethos (echo,v; ,p;) from n -t processes.
In PROTOCOL D, we say that a process accepts a value vi from p; if it receives identical ethos for v; from at least n -t processes. We define the following functions
Lemma 4.8 PROTOCOL D solves SC(k,t,wvl) in the Byzantine model for k 2 Z(n, t).
At least one process among pl, . . . ,p:+l is correct, and at least n -t receive its value and echo it. Hence it is guaranteed that each correct process receives at least one set of identical n -t echo messages and thus is able to decide. Next we prove validity. Assume that there are no failures. Then all processes are correct and thus the values accepted by any process are input values. All decisions are one of the accepted values. Hence validity wvl is satisfied.
Finally we prove agreement. We compute au upper bound on the number of different decisions for each possible value of f, that is the number of actual failures. By definition, 0 5 f 2 t. We distinguish two cases: (i) n -t -f 5 0 and (ii) n -t -f > 0. In case (i) a correct process may be forced to communicate only with faulty processes. In this case we simply bound the number of decisions with the number of correct processes, that is n -f. In case (ii) the total number of values that correct processes accept from one faulty process is bounded by [*I.
Indeed, a correct process accepts a value when receiving at least n -t ethos, at least n -t -f of which are from correct processes. Thus the total number of values from pl, . . ..pt+l accepted by correct processes is at most (t + 1-f) + f [$$I, that is the number of values sent by correct processes plus the number of values that correct processes may be forced to accept because of the Byzantine behavior of faulty processes. Hence the number of different decisions that we can have is t + 1 -f + f [SJ.
It is possible that this bound is bigger than n -f. In such a case, we can bound the number of different decisions by n -f. Summarizing the two cases we have that for any f, we bound the number of decisions by n-fifn-t-f <Oandbymin{t+l-f+fL$&j,n-f} ifn-t -f > 0. The maximum over all possible values of f is given by Z(n, t). Hence we have that the number of decisions is always at most .Z(n, t), as required. cl
We note that when t < f, [*I = 1 for all 0 5 f 5 t, and therefore, the protocol above guarantees agreement for any k > t (see Figure 3 ).
Remarks
For the Byzantine model, the impossibility results and protocols we have provided in this section leave a small gap for the SC problem defined with validities WV~, RV2 and sv2 and a substantial gap for SC(wvl).
Conclusions and Future Work
We have considered several variations of the k-set consensus problem. The variations were obtained by considering six different validity conditions. One of these variations is the k-set consensus problem introduced by Chaudhuri [5] and considered by several papers in the literature. Several of the other variations have been considered for the classical, i.e., k = 1, consensus problem. We showed that the exact definition of the validity condition is crucial in order to discern solvable from impossible. Known results had demarcated this line for the problem considered by Chaudhuri. In this paper we have provided this line for the other variations of the problem. The results show that this line changes depending on the exact definition of the validity condition. We have considered each of the variations in the message-passing model with either crash-failures or Byzantine failures. In most of the cases we were able to exactly demarcate the line between solvable and impossible; in a few cases there is still a gap to be filled in.
One area of ongoing work is to perform a similar analysis for k-set consensus problems in shared-memory systems. Many of the techniques we developed here are useful for providing protocols and proving impossibilities in this case. In some cases, translations between the shared memory model and the message passing model are possible [2] , allowing us to use the protocols developed for the message passing model. However, these do not always provide solutions with the highest fault tolerance possible, and do not hold when Byzantine failures are possible. In these cases, protocols designed specifically for thii context are required. The impossibility result of [3,7,13, l] (i.e., Lemma 3.2) also applies to the shared memory model. Future work will provide full analysis of this context.
A second natural direction is to consider synchrorious systems. For synchronous settings, we note that any protocol that works in asynchronous systems works also in synchronous systems. There are protocols to solve SC(IE, t,~vl) for any t in the synchronous crash setting (see, e.g., [lo, Ch. 71 ). Some of the impossibility proofs provided in this p* per still work in the synchronous setting. Putting together these results we can almost demarcate the line between possible and impossible for the synchronous message-passing crash model. However for the other models, especially with Byzantine failures, nothing is known (except, of course, for the known results on l-consensus, e.g., (8, 9, 121) .
